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THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF




The primary purpose of Steven Smith's provocative article "Legal
Discourse and the De Facto Disestablishment" is to call attention to
what he refers to as a "de facto disestablishment of religion" in our legal
discourse. He argues that this de facto disestablishment "is different
than, and much more sweeping in its effects than, the formal
disestablishment jurisprudence that is explicitly invoked in judicial
opinions and lawyers' briefs."' It operates more or less silently beneath
the surface of the law and deeply influences legal thinking and judicial
decision making. Although the exact boundaries of the de facto
disestablishment are hard to define, Smith attempts to chart the
"geography" of this de facto disestablishment in four zones: (1)
controversies implicating "core establishment clause prohibitions and
the paradigmatic church-state controversies;" (2) controversies not
paradigmatically evoking establishment clause issues but involving
religion or religious institutions; (3) libertarian legal prohibitions against
particular instances of apparently religiously motivated paternalism
(e.g., proscriptions on abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, or
obscenity); and (4) the common law or, more broadly, non-
constitutional judicial decisions. Moreover, from the perspective of de
facto disestablishment, he emphasizes that
religion is not viewed as a resource or a potentially helpful
approach to understanding the day-to-day issues of law. So the
* J.D., 1989, Northwestern University; A.M., 1988, Ph.D. Candidate, The University of
Chicago. Adjunct Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. I thank
Franklin I. Gamwell for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article and Scott Idleman
for inviting me to participate in this engaging symposium. (Editor's Note: While Professor
Modak-Truran did not participant in the Religion and the Judicial Process Conference, the
Law Review is pleased to include him in this issue.)
1. Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and The De Facto Disestablishment, 81 MARQ. L.
REv. 203 (1998) [hereinafter Smith, De Facto Disestablishment].
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law curriculum's use of religion differs categorically from its use
of economics, for instance, or moral and political philosophy, or
feminist or critical race theory, or history, or (more occasionally)
literary theory or sociology or psychology. By-and-large, religion
is deemed significant and worthy of law's attention not because it
provides potentially valuable perspectives or helpful insights, but
because it constitutes a special kind of problem for the law.2
In response to this insightful analysis, I will not attempt to call into
question Smith's descriptive account of this de facto disestablishment,
but for the most part, I will presume that it accurately characterizes our
legal discourse and argue that this de facto disestablishment has caused a
blindness to the religious dimension of judicial decision making.
Despite the de facto disestablishment of religion, I will try to illustrate
the centrality of religion as a resource for understanding judicial
decision making. The central question for this inquiry is: What, if any,
is the role of religious beliefs in judicial decision making? To fully
address this question would require setting forth a philosophy of law, a
philosophy of religion, and an interpretation of the religion clauses of
the First Amendment,3 which I obviously cannot do in this brief
response.4 However, to begin answering this question and to respond to
Smith's de facto disestablishment thesis, I will provide a broad overview
of a more complete argument (i.e., an abridged argument) supporting
2. Id. at 213. See also David M. Smolin, Cracks in the Mirrored Prison: An Evangelical
Critique of Secularist Academic and Judicial Myths Regarding the Relationship of Religion and
American Politics, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1487, 1507 (1996) ("The field of law and religion has
a marginal existence in the legal academy apparently primarily due to a lack of interest and
competency by law professors.").
3. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof'. U.S. CONST. amend. I. With respect to an interpretation of the religion clauses of
the First Amendment, I will presuppose Michael Perry's argument that the essence of "the
free exercise and nonestablishment norms is that government may not make judgments about
the value or disvalue-the true value, the moral value, the social value, any kind of value-of
religions or religious practices or religious (theological) tenets." MICHAEL J. PERRY,
RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECrIVES 9 (1997) [hereinafter
PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS]. In sum, he argues that both the free exercise and
nonestablishment norms are anti-discrimination provisions. The free exercise norm means
that the government may not take prohibitory action which disfavors one or more religious
practices as such. Likewise, the nonestablishment norm means that the government may not
take action favoring one or more religions as such (in effect discriminating against others).
4. Cf. FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: MODERN
POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION 5, 8 (1995). Gamwell argues that both a political
philosophy and a philosophy of religion are required to answer the question: "What, if
anything, is the proper relation between politics and religion, given that the political
community includes an indeterminate plurality of legitimate religions?" Id. at 8.
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the thesis that judicial deliberation necessarily relies on a
comprehensive or religious conviction about authentic human existence
in hard cases but that the establishment clause of the First Amendment
requires that these comprehensive claims remain implicit in judicial
opinions.
In order to support this abridged argument, I will summarily propose
a formal definition of religion as a "comprehensive claim or conviction
about human authenticity."' I will also assume that the law is
indeterminate (in some moderate sense) such that there are hard cases
where the apparently relevant statutes, common law principles,
contracts, or constitutional provisions at issue do not clearly resolve
disputes. Given this understanding of law and religion, I will then chart
the logically possible models for the relationship between law and
religion in judicial decision making in hard cases. Before setting forth
my position, I will consider and point out problems with the "de facto
disestablishment model" that maintains that both the deliberative
process and the process of justification in judicial decision making
should be independent of comprehensive or religious convictions. John
Rawls's model of the Supreme Court as the exemplar of public reason
will be used to represent the de facto disestablishment model. Finally, I
will illustrate my position by briefly examining the Supreme Court
opinion and en banc Ninth Circuit opinion in Washington v.
5. Some claim that there is no universally accepted definition of religion (or method of
defining it) and probably never will be. Cf Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81
MARQ. L. REV. 441, 454 (1998) (pointing out the difficulties of defining religion and
identifying "the goal of religious studies in the undergraduate context and in legal and
political ones, but also in a scholarly setting, is to develop a common discourse about religion
and religious difference"). Others argue that "[rieligion is one thing to the anthropologist,
another to the sociologist, another to the psychologist," another to the theologian, and
another to the philosopher. JOHN HICK, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 3 (2d ed. 1973).
However, this results in part from the different purposes of the many types of inquiries that
analyze the nature of religion including the anthropology of religion (e.g., Clifford Geertz),
sociology of religion (e.g., Emile Durkheim, Peter L. Berger), psychology of religion (e.g.,
William James), history of religions (e.g., Mircea Eliade), theology (e.g., Paul Tillich), and
philosophy of religion (e.g., Charles Hartshorne). For example, sociology of religion views
religion "in terms of social interaction" and studies religion "with reference to the general
concepts of sociology, including leadership, stratification, and socialization." GEORGE A.
THEODORSON & ACHILLES G. THEODORSON, A MODERN DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY
406 (1969). For our purposes, however, the central concern is to understand the role of
religious convictions or claims in legal reasoning. The primary concern is with the kind of
claims religion makes and how religious claims are related to other types of claims such as
legal and moral claims. In contrast to other approaches to understanding religion like
sociology and psychology of religion, the philosophy of religion has typically focused on these
questions. Thus, I will take a philosophy of religion approach in order to define religion in
such a way as to outline the relationship between religious claims and legal and moral claims.
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Glucksberg.6 Both of these opinions help disclose the necessity of
relying on comprehensive or religious claims about authentic human
existence in hard cases.
II. CLARIFYING THE ISSUES AND MODELS
Since we know that judicial decision making involves both
deliberation and justification, the question about the role of religious
beliefs in judicial decision making should be more precisely analyzed
into two separate issues: (1) Is it proper for a judge to rely on religious
beliefs in deliberation, and if so, under what circumstances and in which
cases?; and (2) Is it proper for a judge to announce a religious basis for a
decision in a judicial opinion, and if so, under what circumstances and in
which cases? The first issue concerns what is entailed in the process of
legal reasoning as such (the deliberative process) while the second issue
concerns what types of reasons judges should be allowed to rely on in
written judicial opinions (the process of justification) in a pluralistic
democratic society.
By keeping these issues distinct, we explicitly recognize the four
logical possibilities for the role of religious beliefs in judicial decision
making. The four possibilities include:
6. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). By using a hard case that strongly supports the necessary
judicial reliance on religious or comprehensive claims about authentic human existence (Le.,
whether life is ever not worth living and suicide is warranted), I do not mean to suggest that
these are the only or primary types of hard cases where religious claims are relied on. But cf.
PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 3, at 3-4 (emphasizing that he is principally
concerned in this book with political choices "that ban or otherwise disfavor one or another
sort of human conduct on the view that the conduct is immoral."); Scott C. Idleman, Note,
The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making, 68 IND. L. J. 433, 435 (1993)
(emphasizing that "this Note does not necessarily envision an explicit role for religious values
in the vast majority of legal controversies; rather, the focus is on ethically difficult cases, or
other so-called 'hard cases,' where judicial reference to religious values, among others, may
be particularly appropriate, helpful, and even necessary"). Rather, my general thesis is that
comprehensive convictions are relied upon in all hard cases not just some hard cases. Cases
like Washington v. Glucksberg have the advantage of disclosing more explicitly the necessity
of relying on comprehensive convictions while other hard cases may appear to rely only on
non-comprehensive norms (e.g., notions of property) which are linked to comprehensive or
religious convictions in a less obvious way. Thus, to make the strongest case (in this abridged
argument) for the reliance on comprehensive convictions in the judicial deliberation of hard
cases, I will only focus on Washington v. Glucksberg in the following discussion.
[Vol. 81:255
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Relied on in Judicial






Decision Making yes no religionist-
disestablishment
Further, from this chart, we can develop four different models of judicial
decision making. I will refer to the first possibility as the de facto
disestablishment model8 of judicial decision making. It maintains that
religious beliefs or convictions should not be relied on either in
deliberation or justification. Given the predominance and often
unexamined or blind acceptance of this model, the conclusion is usually
that religion should have nothing to do with judicial decision making.
For this reason, the other three models are usually not given a second
thought; the de facto disestablishment has blinded us from fully
appreciating these other models.
One reason for this pervasive blindness is that the second model
which maintains that religious convictions can or should be relied on in
judicial deliberation and justification (the religionist model) is usually
considered the only alternative to the disestablishment model. In fact, if
deliberation and justification are not differentiated, this is the only
alternative to the disestablishment model. Within certain constraints,
the religionist model was vigorously embraced by judges in nineteenth
century. For example, in Vidal v. Girard's Executors,9 Joseph Story
7. It should be noted that allowing judges to rely on religious beliefs or convictions in
judicial deliberation or justification could take the form of a permissive use of these beliefs
(can) or a required use of these beliefs (must) while a prohibition against relying on religious
beliefs or convictions in judicial decision making only takes the form of a requirement not to
rely on these beliefs. In addition, for an alternative matrix of models for the relationship
between law and religion in judicial decision making, see Daniel 0. Conkle, Religiously
Devout Judges: Issues of Personal Integrity and Public Benefit, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 523 (1998).
8. Note that for the sake of brevity, I will usually refer to this as the "disestablishment
model" rather than the de facto disestablishment model." Further, I think Steven Smith
clearly demonstrates that the de facto disestablishment goes far beyond the required de jure
disestablishment. However, as the First Amendment religion clause jurisprudence clearly
indicates, it is often very difficult to determine precisely where the de jure disestablishment
ends and the de facto disestablishment begins.
9. 43 U.S. 126 (1844).
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made his famous claims that the United States was a "Christian Nation"
and that "the Christian religion is a part of the common law."'
Currently, this position does not receive much support.1 For reasons I
cannot fully specify here and for reasons given below, the religionist
model would appear to violate the establishment clause by favoring one
or more religions as such (in effect discriminating against others)."
Thus, I will not consider the religionist model as a viable alternative to
the disestablishment model.
In addition, these reasons and others would also eliminate the third
model which holds that religious convictions should not be relied on in
deliberation but can or should be relied on in justification
(disestablishment-religionist model). If the judge accepted the
distinction between "legal reasons" and "religious reasons" with respect
to deliberation, it is hard to think of a reason why she would give up on
this distinction with respect to the process of justification. Unless the
judge was part of a society that was explicitly ruled by religious law (e.g.,
an Islamic country), it is hard to see this model as viable. Consequently,
10. Id. at 128. See also Joseph Story, Christianity a Part of the Common Law, 9 AM.
JURIST 346 (1833); CUSHING STROUT, THE NEW HEAVENS AND NEW EARTH: POLITICAL
RELIGION IN AMERICA 99 (1974) (noting that many early state court decisions "assumed that
Christianity was itself part of the common law inherited from England"); Harold Berman,
The Interaction of Law and Religion, 31 MERCER L. REV. 405, 406 (1980) (noting that courts
in the nineteenth century "declared very often that the Christian religion is the law of the
land, that Christianity is part of the common law, and that the Constitution on its face shows
that the Christian religion was the religion of the framers").
11. See KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 142
(1995) ("Judges assume that people in this country have variant religious views .... [n1o
particular religious view is seen to be embedded in the legal materials themselves or to be
part of some common understanding or technique of reason that stretches beyond the legal
materials but can be a source of guidance."). But cf Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for
Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 513 (1998) (arguing that
judges "have the right to include religious sources when [they] justify the decisions [they]
reach" even though "religious values are not universally shared by all persons, or even all
judges for that matter"). Michael Perry has also made some statements that suggest support
for this model in certain circumstances. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 3, at
103-04. Perry argues that "[i]f a plausible secular premise does support [a political] choice...
government, including the judicial branch, may rely on a religious premise." Id. at 103. Perry
subsequently questions whether a legal decision can be " 'reasoned and available to the
public' if in its opinion a court conceals one of the premises on which it has consciously
relied" and thus implies that the court should disclose its reliance on a religious premise in its
opinion. Id. at 104.
12. Although Michael Perry probably would not agree with this assessment of disclosing
religious convictions in written opinions, see supra note 11, I am relying on his interpretation
of the religion clause as anti-discrimination provisions. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS,
supra note 3, at 9. In this respect, the de facto disestablishment of religion from legal
discourse is probably better characterized as a dejure disestablishment.
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since this is not the case in the United States, this does not appear to be
a viable model worthy of further consideration.
However, the apparent de facto disestablishment of religion from
legal discourse does not necessarily mean that religion should or can be
disestablished from legal deliberation in hard cases. The fourth model
(religionist-disestablishment model) was first identified by Kent
Greenawalt' and soon thereafter embraced by Stephen Carter.14
Greenawalt argues that "shared premises and ways of reasoning have
priority and that these will get judges all of the way in the vast majority
of cases," but that "on exceptional occasions the indecisiveness of legal
and public reasons will be sufficiently apparent to allow a judge to make
a self-conscious use of personal convictions [including comprehensive
and religious convictions]."' 5 By contrast, Carter argues for a larger role
for religious convictions such that in any cases where judges must rely
on moral convictions (e.g., fundamental rights cases), religiously
grounded moral beliefs should not be treated differently from other
moral convictions. 6 Although not explicitly addressing the merits of
these positions, the burden of the following discussion is to make a
much stronger argument for this position. It attempts to demonstrate
that judges necessarily rely (implicitly or explicitly) on religious or
comprehensive convictions about authentic human existence in all hard
cases. Moreover, given the preceding evaluation of the other models,
the only alternative to this position that will be considered is the
disestablishment model which maintains that religious beliefs should not
enter into either deliberation or justification.
13. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVIcIMONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 239-41
(1988); see also GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 11, at 142-50.
14. Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932, 943
(1989) (arguing that "if religious conviction plays a role at all, it would enter into the
deliberative process, but not the process of justification").
15. GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 11, at 149-50.
16. Carter, supra note 14, at 935, 943.
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III. DEFINING RELIGION AND LAW
A. Definition of Religion17
Regarding the definition of religion, I will adopt and slightly modify
Schubert Ogden's definition of religion as "the primary form of culture
in terms of which we human beings explicitly ask and answer the
existential question of the meaning of ultimate reality for us."'
8
According to this account, religion asks what is "authentic human
existence" or "how are we to understand ourselves and others in
relation to the whole". 9 The existential question, the question of
meaning, is thus the question which is presupposed by all other
questions. It is the comprehensive question concerning "what is the
valid comprehensive self-understanding" or "comprehensive human
purpose."'  In other words, religion includes a comprehensive
17. Although definitions are not something that can be said to be definitively true or
right, the one I will propose serves the purpose of putting on equal footing all arguably
"extra-legal" claims about "authentic human existence". See BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE:
THEORY AND CONTEXT 32 (1996) (Commenting on the definition of law, Bix claims that,
"one might not be able to say that a particular conceptual analysis was 'right' or 'true' (at
least not in the sense that there would be only one unique 'right' or 'true' answer for all
conceptual questions), but I do not see this as a significant loss. It would be sufficient that
one can affirm (or deny) that an analysis is good (or better than an alternative) for a
particular purpose."). As a practical matter, this is very helpful because it treats all of these
imported normative claims as similar for purposes of considering the legitimacy of legal
decision making under conditions of indeterminacy. By calling all these claims religious, we
signal both that they are typically considered "extra-legal" and that they are considered to be
normative claims about authentic human existence that judges are relying on in judicial
decision making. In other words, these claims have an equivalence in terms of their type
("extra-legal") and in terms their logical function (normative claims about "authentic human
existence"). On this account, this definition of religion seems better than the narrow
definition of religion in theistic terms because it makes explicit all the "extra-legal" normative
claims about authentic human existence that may be informing legal decision making.
Furthermore, this definition of religion is offered for the purpose of engaging the liberal
claim that legal and political principles can somehow be independent of religious or
metaphysical claims (i.e., as Rawls says, "political not metaphysical"), and it helps us
determine more precisely whether legal decision making can be done based on political and
not metaphysical norms.
18. SCHUBERT M. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE TRUE RELIGION OR ARE THERE
MANY? 5 (1992). Cf. MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE & POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 73 (1991) ("Religious faith is best understood as trust in
the ultimate meaningfulness of life-that is, the ultimate meaningfulness of the world and of
one's own life, one's own being, as part of and related to, as embedded in, the world.").
19. OGDEN, supra note 18, at 6.
20. GAMWELL, supra note 4, at 22-23. Gamwell explicitly recognizes that his "definition
and discussion of religion is nothing other than an attempt to appropriate [Ogden's]
formulations for the purpose of the present inquiry." Id. at 15 n.1. Cf Smith, supra note 1, at
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evaluation of life (human activity) in terms of the nature of existence to
determine "how human activity as such ought to make a difference to
the larger reality of which it is a part."2' In fact, "everything that we
think, say, or do, insofar, at least, as it makes or implies a claim to
validity, necessarily presupposes that ultimate reality is such as to
authorize some understanding of ourselves as authentic and that,
conversely, some understanding of our existence is authentic because it
is authorized by ultimate reality."2 On this account, religion is essential
to understanding all human activity (including judicial decision making)
because we ask and answer the existential or comprehensive question, at
least implicitly, in all human activity.' Thus, all human activity
(including judicial decision making) is implicitly or explicitly informed
by a comprehensive self-understanding or an understanding of what
constitutes authentic human existence which determines how any
particular human activity (e.g., judicial decision making) is related to the
purpose of human life as such (authentic human existence).
Consequently, for the purposes of this discussion, "religion" wil be
equated with a "comprehensive claim or conviction about human
authenticity." This means that religion not only includes the recognized
world religions of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and
Buddhism, but it also includes humanism, capitalism (when proposed as
a normative rather than as a positive theory), communism, and other so-
called secular answers to the existential question. Further, this means
that there is and always has been a plurality of religions or
comprehensive self-understandings. As a result, judges, at least
implicitly, have comprehensive self-understandings (i.e., they are
religious), and they rely on a plurality of comprehensive religious
convictions in the deliberation of hard cases.
216 (claiming that "what we call 'religion' typically amounts to a comprehensive way of
perceiving and understanding life and the world; it affects everything").
21. GAMWELL, supra note 4, at 25.
22. OGDEN, supra note 18, at 7.
23. See GAMWELL, supra note 4, at 23. Gamwell further notes that this does not mean
that all human activity is religious but that "the character of human activity as such implies
the possibility of religion, in the sense that it implies the comprehensive question and,
therefore, the possibility that this question is asked and answered explicitly." Id. at 23 n.5.
Human activity is thus religious only to the extent that the existential or comprehensive
question has been explicitly asked and answered. See Id. For the purposes of this article,
however, I will ignore this distinction and use the terms religious and comprehensive
interchangeably.
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B. Definition of Law
As with my summary treatment of the central question of the
philosophy of religion ("what is religion?"), I will likewise not attempt
to give a complete answer to the central question of jurisprudence or the
philosophy of law ("what is law?"). While a full consideration of the
question of the role of religious beliefs in judicial decision making would
require both a descriptive and normative account of law, I will elaborate
a normative account of law only to the extent required to determine
whether religious beliefs ought to play a role in judicial decision making
and make one essential descriptive assumption. The essential
descriptive assumption is that the law is indeterminate such that there
are hard cases where the apparently relevant statutes, common law
principles, contracts, or constitutional law provisions at issue do not
clearly resolve the dispute. Many theorists now refer to this broadly as
legal indeterminacy. '
Note that even H.L.A. Hart's manifesto of legal positivism, The
Concept of Law, takes a middle path between formalism and rule
skepticism such that the indeterminacy of the law allows for "varied
types of reasoning which courts characteristically use in exercising the
creative function left to them by the open texture of law in statue or
precedent."'  Hart helps make clear here that this open texture or
indeterminacy concerns not only "particular legal rules" but also "the
ultimate criteria of validity" which he refers to as "the rule of
recognition" (e.g. United States Constitution). With respect to the rule
of recognition, this results in a paradoxical situation where courts are
determining the ultimate criteria of legal validity in the process of
deciding whether a particular law is valid.26 In order to make the
strongest case for the religionist-disestablishment model, I will define
24. See, e.g., Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy and Legitimacy, in LEGAL
HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 200-15 (Gregory Leyh ed. 1992).
25. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 144 (2d ed. 1989). Hart notes that the rule of
recognition can be partly, but never completely, indeterminate. For example, in the United
States, the United States Constitution could be indeterminate in some sense, but the rule of
recognition conferring authority (jurisdiction) on the court to exercise its creative powers to
settle the ultimate criteria of validity raises no doubts even though the precise scope of that
power may raise some doubts. Id. at 148-49. Note further that by taking this middle path, I
will not be addressing formalism (e.g., Ernest Weinrib) and rule skepticism (e.g., critical legal
studies, deconstructionism, some legal realists). These theories would involve a different
discussion than the discussion here which involves an assumption that the law is determinate
in some sense (Le., there are easy cases) but also that it is indeterminate or has an open
texture in some sense (i.e., there are hard cases).
26. Id. at 148.
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hard cases as those where the primary rules (e.g., statutes and case law)
and the rule of recognition are indeterminate in some senseV Hart
claims that "the law in such cases is fundamentally incomplete: it
provides no answer to the questions at issue in such cases" and that
courts must exercise the restricted law-making function which he refers
to as discretion.' Consequently, in hard cases, the judge "is entitled to
follow standards or reasons for decision which are not dictated by the
law and may differ from those followed by other judges faced with
similar hard cases." 29
IV. NORMATIVE MODELS
Given this descriptive account of the indeterminacy of the law, it is
at this point that a normative account of law (i.e., a rational justification
or legitimation of law) must be called upon to specify what "standards
or reasons for decisions which are not dictated by law" a judge should
rely on in hard cases. In this respect, I will elaborate a normative
account of law only to the extent required to determine whether
religious beliefs ought to play a role in judicial decision making and in
which cases. Assuming that the law is determinate in some sense (i.e.,
some cases are easy) and that judges have a duty to apply the law, both
the normative models identified above (the disestablishment model and
the religionist-disestablishment model) must accept that the law is
independent of comprehensive convictions at least in easy cases.
Further, these models can be recast in terms of the preceding descriptive
account of legal indeterminacy as follows: either the rule of recognition
is unitary such that it justifies all legal decisions independently of
comprehensive convictions-even in hard cases-(disestablishment
model) or the rule of recognition is two-tiered such that in easy cases the
27. Hart refers to the descriptive account of law as the external point of view and the
normative account of law as the internal point of view. Id at 86-88. From the external point
of view, Hart claims that "two minimum conditions" are "necessary and sufficient for the
existence of a legal system" which is a union of primary and secondary rules:
On the one hand those rules of behavior which are valid according to the system's
ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed [primary rules], and, on the
other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its
rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public
standards of official behavior by its officials [secondary rules].
Id. at 113. Consequently, the normative validity of law (participant or internal point of view)
is determined with respect the secondary rule referred to as the "rule of recognition" which is
"ultimate criteria of validity".
28. Id. at 252 (emphasis in original).
29. Id. at 273.
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law is independent of comprehensive convictions but in hard cases it is
not (religionist-disestablishment model). Although these two models
could take several forms,' I will examine these models by engaging John
Rawls as an example of the first model and by presenting my position as
an example of the second model.
A. The Disestablishment Model: Rawls's Idea of Public Reason
In evaluating Rawls as the disestablishment model, the following
does not attempt to summarize Rawls's complete theory of Political
Liberalism. Rather, it focuses on the idea of public reason and, in
particular, how judges rely on public reason in hard cases involving
constitutional essentials (i.e., political rights and liberties) and matters of
basic justice (i.e., matters relating to the basic structure of society such
as basic economic and social justice which are not covered by the
constitution).31
In Political Liberalism, Rawls argues that from two basic ideas (the
idea of society as a fair system of cooperation and the idea of persons as
free and equal) implicit in a democratic political culture, we can specify
the conditions (i.e., the original position-including its thick veil of
ignorance) for coming to an agreement on a political conception of
justice in a democratic society. Rawls claims that this thought
experiment establishes this conception of justice as "freestanding" (i.e.,
"political not metaphysical") in that it does not depend upon a
comprehensive doctrine for its justification. However, Rawls argues
that "an agreement on a political conception of justice is to no effect
without a companion agreement on guidelines of public inquiry and
rules for assessing evidence."32 Rawls argues that his idea of public
reason indicates what these guidelines and rules would entail in a
democratic society of free and equal citizens. The "content of public
reason" is formulated by a political conception of justice ("political
30. For example, another representative of the disestablishment model is Jurgen
Habermas. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 28 (William Rehg trans., 1996) Habermas
maintains that the discourse of application (including both the process of deliberation and
justification) allows for an impartial application of law that is independent of comprehensive
religious or metaphysical worldviews. Id. In addition, Greenawalt and Carter were identified
above as alternative representations of the religionist-disestablishment model. See supra
notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
31. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765,767 (1997)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Rawls, Public Reason Revisited]. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 213 (paperback ed. 1996) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
32. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 31, at 139.
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values of public reason") which includes two parts and two values: (1)
substantive principles of justice for the basic structure ("the values of
political justice"), and (2) "guidelines of inquiry" including "principles
of reasoning and rules of evidence in light of which citizens are to decide
whether substantive principles properly apply and to identify laws and
policies that best satisfy them" ("the values of public reason").3
With respect to judicial decision making, Rawls argues that both the
deliberative process and the process of justification should rely solely on
the political values of public reason, which are independent of
comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrines.' 4 Rawls
maintains that "the political values of public reason provide the Court's
basis for interpretation. A political conception of justice covers the
fundamental questions addressed by higher law and sets out the political
values in terms of which they can be decided."'35 Further, in hard cases,
Rawls argues that judges should seek the best interpretation of the law.
The best interpretation is the one that "best fits" the constitution and
relevant statutes and precedent and the one that can be given an
objective justification based on a public political conception of justice
(political values of public reason).' Further, "public reason is the sole
reason the court exercises" ("they have no other reason and no other
values than political") while "[c]itizens and legislators may properly
vote their more comprehensive views when constitutional essentials and
basic justice are not at stake."'37 For Rawls, the United States Supreme
Court is the exemplar of public reason. In this respect, he further
emphasizes that
33. Id. at 223-24. Note that with respect to the content of public reason, Rawls appears
to use the term "public reason" in a broad and narrow sense. The content of public reason
(broad sense) is a political conception of justice which includes principles of justice (values of
political justice) and guidelines of inquiry (values of public reason) (narrow sense). When I
use the term "political values of public reason," I will be referring to the broad sense
(including the values of political justice and public reason), and when I use the term "values
of public reason," I will be referring to the narrow sense. In the narrow sense, Rawls further
maintains that "[t]he values of public reason not only include the appropriate use of the
fundamental concepts of judgment, inference, and evidence, but also the virtues of
reasonableness and fairmindedness as shown in abiding by the criteria and procedures of
commonsense knowledge and accepting the methods and conclusions of science when not
controversial." Id. at 139.
34. l& at 139.
35. Id. at 234.
36. In contrast to Dworkin, Rawls maintains that "[tihe values the judges can invoke are
restricted to what is reasonably believed to be covered by that conception or its variants, and
not by a conception of morality as such, not even of political morality." Id. at 237 n. 23.
37. Id. at 235.
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[t]he justices cannot, of course, invoke their own personal
morality, nor the ideals and virtues of morality generally. Those
they must view as irrelevant. Equally, they cannot invoke their
or other people's religious or philosophical views. Nor can they
cite political values without restriction. Rather, they must appeal
to the political values they think belong to the most reasonable
understanding of the public conception and its political values of
justice and public reason. 8
Thus, when the relevant legal materials are indeterminate, Rawls
maintains that the court must rely on the political values of public
reason to resolve a dispute about constitutional essentials or matters of
basic justice.
However, Rawls's idea of public reason as a "political not
metaphysical" solution to legal indeterminacy has some serious
problems that may call its validity into question. First, as Michael Perry
has recently noted, Rawls fails to tell us what a judge may rely on if the
political values of public reason (political conception of justice), like the
relevant legal materials, are indeterminate. 9 In other words, if the rule
of recognition (political values of public reason) is indeterminate, what
normative basis does the judge rely on to come to a decision. Rawls
argues that this is rare,4° but Perry has emphasized that "he is simply
wrong."'" Although Rawls further recognizes that "public reason often
allows more than one reasonable answer to any particular question,"42
38. Id. at 236.
39. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 3, at 103.
40. Rawls notes that,
[o]ne objection to the wide view of public reason is that it is still too restrictive.
However, to establish this, we must find pressing questions of constitutional
essentials or matters of basic justice (IV:5) that cannot be reasonably resolved by
political values expressed by any of the existing reasonable political conceptions, nor
also by any such conception that could be worked out. [Political Liberalism] doesn't
argue that this can never happen; it only suggests that it rarely does so. Whether
public reason can settle all, or almost all, political questions by a reasonable
ordering of political values cannot be decided in the abstract independent of actual
cases.
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 32, at liii. He further criticizes those, like
Greenawalt, who argue that public reason may fail to resolve some of these questions and
advocate that citizens may resort to nonpolitical values to resolve these issues.
41. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 3, at 103.
42. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 32, at 240. Rawls further notes "that
different political conceptions of justice will represent different interpretations of the
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice" and that "[t]here are also different
interpretations of the same conception, since its concepts and values may be take in different
ways." Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 31, at 777 n.35. Although he recognizes
that "[tihere is not... a sharp line between where a political conception ends and its
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his practical application of the political values of public reason (political
conception of justice) to concrete questions (e.g., abortion) and the
majority of his other comments suggest that he considers the political
values of public reason quite determinate or complete such that "the
values specified by it can be suitably ordered or otherwise united so that
those values alone give a reasonable answer to all, or to nearly all,
questions involving constitutional essentials and matters of basic
justice."43 Certainly, we cannot settle this question here. However, one
insightful example of Rawls's belief in the "completeness" of the
political values of public reason is his claim that "any reasonable
balance of these three [political] values ["due respect for human life,"
"ordered reproduction of political society over time," and "equality of
women as equal citizens"] will give a woman a duly qualified right to
decide whether or not to end her pregnancy during the first trimester.""
The ease with which he comes to this conclusion about the hotly
debated issue of abortion raises serious doubts about the credibility of
Rawls's claim that the political values of public reason can provide "a
reasonable answer to all, or to nearly all, questions involving the
constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice." Furthermore,
although this example does not refute Rawls's claims about the
completeness of the political values of public reason (i.e., that the
political values of public reason are able to resolve most, if not all,
disputes), it suggests that Rawls has a highly formalistic understanding
of legal adjudication (at least with respect to the functioning of the
political values of public reason-the rule of recognition-in hard
cases). As a result, either the political values of public reason are more
indeterminate or incomplete than Rawls claims, or they are more
determinate or complete than most legal scholars and lawyers could
credibly acknowledge. Thus, in the first case, comprehensive doctrines
interpretation begins," Rawls concludes that "a conception greatly limits its possible
interpretations, otherwise discussion and argument could not proceed." Id.
43. Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 31, at 777. See also RAWLs, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 32, at 225 (emphasis added). "The significance of completeness lies
in the fact that unless a political conception is complete, it is not an adequate framework of
thought in the light of which the discussion of fundamental political conceptions can be
carried out." Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 31, at 777.
44. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 32, at 243 n.32. Although Rawls now
characterizes this analysis of the abortion question as his opinion rather than an argument, he
suggests that it could be developed into an argument and that the outcome of a vote to
support this would be legitimate "provided all government officials, supported by other
reasonable citizens, or a reasonably just constitutional regime sincerely vote in accordance
with the idea of public reason." Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra, note 31, at 798, 798
n.80.
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may be relied on to resolve hard cases (like the religionist-
disestablishment model), or, in the second case, the disestablishment
model requires the adoption of some form of legal formalism which
most legal scholars and lawyers would reject.
In addition, Rawls's public reason requires religious judges to order
the political values of public reason in hard cases on grounds they
cannot accept as valid. Recall that when the relevant legal materials are
indeterminate, Rawls maintains that the court must rely on the political
values of public reason to resolve a dispute about constitutional
essentials or matters of basic justice. Further, Rawls argues that in order
for the political values alone to "give a reasonable answer to all, or
nearly all, questions involving constitutional essentials and matters of
basic justice," the ordering of values must be made
in light of their structure and features within the political
conception itself, and not primarily from how they occur within
citizens' comprehensive doctrines. Political values are not to be
ordered by viewing them separately and detached from one
another or from any definite context. They are not puppets
manipulated from behind the scenes by comprehensive
doctrines."
No religious judge, however, could accept this "political not
metaphysical" ordering of political values in hard cases. A
comprehensive or religious conviction "purports to identify the
necessary and sufficient moral condition or comprehensive condition of
all valid moral claims." Thus, for the religious judge, an ordering of
political values is valid only if it coincides with the ordering dictated by
her comprehensive or religious convictions. Yet, Rawls's political
liberalism maintains that the political values of public reason must be
ordered exclusively by a "political not metaphysical" conception of
justice (freestanding) even in hard cases. In other words, this requires
that every religious adherent reject their claim that his or her
comprehensive conviction is valid. Only those judges who deny all
comprehensive convictions (i.e., believe that political values are
independent of any particular answer to the comprehensive question)
could accept Rawls's "political not metaphysical" ordering of political
values in hard cases.' As a result, it is not clear how a liberal political
45. Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 31, at 777.
46. GAMWELL, supra note 4, at 71.
47. Cf GAMWELL, supra note 4, at 73 ("At best, in other words, the consensus that
Rawls's political liberalism requires is joined only by those who deny all comprehensive
convictions, citizens who believe that principles of justice are independent of any particular
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conception of justice (political values of public reason) could be the
subject of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive
doctrines that Rawls claims is required for a stable society. Thus, either
the acceptance of the exclusively political ordering of political values is a
mere modus vivendi or no consensus is possible (there is a plurality of
orderings of political values informing the law-the religionist-
disestablishment model). Moreover, although these criticisms of
Rawls's idea of public reason are not necessarily conclusive, they raise
serious doubts about the viability of the disestablishment model.
answer to the comprehensive question because no comprehensive conviction is valid.").
Rawls position, however, may finally be incoherent because he claims that an objective
legitimization of law must be independent of comprehensive convictions (Le., based on the
political values of public reason) because comprehensive convictions are nonpublic (Le., not
reasonable). However, this claim entails a comprehensive denial of all comprehensive
convictions (moral relativism) which according to Rawls is not possible and thus results in an
incoherent account of judicial decision making. In this respect, Franklin Gamwell argues that
"[b]ecause a denial of all religious or comprehensive convictions is itself a (negative)
comprehensive claim, it prevents the validation or justification of any positive beliefs about
human authenticity, comprehensive or otherwise." GAMWELL, supra note 4, at 139. In other
words,
[i]f there is no character or positive principle of human authenticity that is valid
under all historical conditions, then all valid understandings of human authenticity
must be relative to some or other specific circumstances. But, then, no moral claim
could be justified without validating moral relativism, and moral relativism is a
positive claim about human authenticity, the validity of which cannot be relative to
specific circumstances. To assert that the moral norms of every actual and possible
human activity are in all respects relative is to make a positive claim about human
activity that is comprehensive. In other words, moral relativism is self-refuting
because it implies the comprehensive condition that it denies, and therefore, the
denial of all comprehensive convictions prevents the validation of any moral claim
at all.
Id. at 139-40. Thus, Rawls claim that a political conception of justice (political values of
public reason) must be independent of comprehensive claims implies a comprehensive denial
of comprehensive convictions (moral relativism) and is self-refuting.
48. Rawls argues that a stable society requires an overlapping consensus on a political
conception of justice and not merely a modus vivendi. A modus vivendi is merely a strategic
agreement "founded on a convergence of self- or group-interests" that the principles of
justice are amenable to a certain agenda of political action. Rawls gives the example of a
treaty between two nations who are in general "ready to pursue their goals at the expense of
the other" but agree not to because under circumstances it is beneficial not to do so. RAWLs,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 32, at 147. Furthermore, Rawls thinks that a modus
vivendi is inherently unstable because the alliances formed, by nations or citizens are
dependent upon a certain balance of power in the society. If the balance of power changes,
they would no long agree that the principles of justice are warranted.
1998]
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B. The Religionist-Disestablishment Model and The Religious
Dimension of Judicial Decision Making
Assuming that the preceding discussion has indicated some serious
problems with Rawls's attempt to eliminate comprehensive or religious
convictions from judicial deliberation (the disestablishment model), the
only model remaining is the religionist-disestablishment model.
Although the religionist-disestablishment model (like all four models)
could take several forms,49 I will not consider the different formulations
of it, but I will focus on setting forth my interpretation of this model as
an example of it. Under my interpretation, this model claims that the
deliberative process of judicial decision making in hard cases always
implicitly or explicitly relies on a religious or comprehensive conviction
about "authentic human existence" but that the establishment clause of
the first amendment requires that these comprehensive convictions
should remain implicit in judicial opinions. For clarity, it should be
noted that by using the phrase "implicitly or explicitly relies on a
religious or comprehensive conviction about 'authentic human
existence,"' I want to recognize that judges may or may not be self-
conscious of their reliance on comprehensive convictions. Ideally,
judges deliberating in hard cases would explicitly recognize that they are
relying on comprehensive convictions. However, this will not always be
the case. In those cases, my argument is that judges must, at least
implicitly (unconsciously), rely on comprehensive convictions in order
to resolve hard cases. Further, although I will be using a hard case to
demonstrate the religious dimension of judging, I am not making an
empirical argument linking religious affiliations or beliefs to judicial
decisions0 but a claim about the nature of judicial reasoning as such. To
demonstrate the religious dimension of judging, I will first set forth the
general argument that judicial decision making as such requires
implicitly or explicitly relying on comprehensive convictions in hard
cases. Secondly, I will examine how Washington v. Glucksberg
dramatically demonstrates the necessary reliance on comprehensive
claims about authentic human existence, at least implicitly, in the
deliberation process in hard cases. Subsequently, I will set forth some
reasons why comprehensive or religious claims should remain implicit in
49. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Scott C. Idleman, supra note 6, at 473-78 (analyzing the role of religious
values in judicial decision making from four perspectives including the historical-
constitutional, political-philosophical, utilitarian, and empirical perspectives); KENNETH D.
WALD, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES (1987).
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judicial decision making. Finally, in the course of this analysis, I will
consider and respond to two objections-the Public Values Objection
and the Insincerity Objection-to the religionist-disestablishment
model.
1. The Necessity of Religious Convictions in Deliberation
Recall that religion is a "comprehensive claim or conviction about
human authenticity" which provides individuals with an understanding
of authentic human existence (a normative framework for all of life).
Consequently, all humans have, at least implicitly, a comprehensive self-
understanding (i.e., they are religious). Furthermore, these
comprehensive self-understandings inform all human activity (including
judicial decision making) such that all normative claims about human
purpose or authentic human existence implicitly or explicitly rely on
religious convictions. Thus, with respect to normative issues, a
comprehensive or religious conviction "purports to identify the
necessary and sufficient moral condition or comprehensive condition of
all valid moral claims.'
Further, recall that hard cases are those where the primary rules
(e.g., statutes and case law) and the rule of recognition (e.g., United
States Constitution) are indeterminate in some sense. Hard cases thus
involve situations where some "extra-legal" norm must be relied upon
to come to a judgment. Given that religious convictions identify the
comprehensive condition of all valid norms, these norms must implicitly
or explicitly rely on comprehensive or religious convictions about
authentic human existence. Consequently, the nature of judicial
decision making is such that in hard cases, all judicial deliberation
necessarily relies implicitly or explicitly on comprehensive convictions
not dictated by the law itself."
More precisely, the religionist-disestablishment model maintains
that the unstated rule of recognition (ultimate criteria of validity) is
51. GAmWELL, supra note 4, at 71.
52. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 90 (1986) (Dworkin argues that "[a]ny
practical legal argument, no matter how detailed and limited, assumes the kind of abstract
foundation jurisprudence offers, and when rival foundations compete, a legal argument
assumes one and rejects others. So any judge's opinion is itself a piece of legal philosophy,
even when the philosophy is hidden and the visible argument is dominated by citation and
lists of facts. Jurisprudence is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision
at law.") See also GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSEQUENCES, supra note 13, at 145
(Greenawalt argues that both he and Carter "believe a model of decision must include some
reference to what is right (or what a judge believes is right) as a matter of moral and political
philosophy, independent of the legal materials.").
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formal and two-tiered: (1) in easy cases, judges are expected to resolve
legal disputes according to the determinate legal principles; and (2) in
hard cases, judges are expected to resolve legal disputes according to
their best comprehensive or religious judgment of what ought to be
done. In other words, the unstated rule of recognition is formal in that
it allows for a plurality of substantive rules of recognition (ultimate
criterions of validity) to inform the adjudication of hard cases.
Consequently, in hard cases, judges' comprehensive convictions are the
ultimate criterions of validity (rules of recognition) even though judges
should keep these comprehensive convictions implicit in the process of
justification to prevent the establishment of a comprehensive conviction.
Despite the plurality of comprehensive convictions informing
judicial deliberation in hard cases, judges will not necessarily make
highly divergent decisions in hard cases. First, judges may reach the
same results and agree on low-level (noncomprehensive) principles in
their written opinions even though their deliberations are informed by
different comprehensive convictions. In Cass Sunstein's terms, these
situations constitute "incompletely theorized agreements on practical
outcomes., 53  In addition, there are influences on judicial decision
making that promote convergence. For example, Ronald Dworkin has
argued that despite the divergence in judicial convictions about those
justifying purpose, goal, or principle governing legal practice as a whole,
a variety of forces temper these differences and precipitate
convergence. 4 In this respect, he claims that
[e]very community has paradigms of law, propositions that in
practice cannot be challenged without suggesting either
corruption or ignorance . . . .The most powerful influences
toward convergence, however, are internal to the character of
interpretation. The practice of precedent, which no judge's
interpretation can wholly ignore, presses toward agreement; each
judges' theories of what judging really is will incorporate by
reference, through whatever account and restructuring of
precedent he settles on, aspects of other popular interpretations
of the day. Judges think about law, moreover, within society, not
53. CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 37 (1996).
Sunstein argues that law is basically comprised of "incompletely theorized agreements on
particular outcomes, accompanied by agreements on the narrow or low-level principles that
account for them." Id. This allows for substantial disagreement on more general theoretical
principles that attempt to explain and legitimize the law. Consequently, "people may agree
on a correct outcome even though they do not have a theory to account for their judgments."
Id. at 7.
54. Dworkin, supra note 52 at 87-88.
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apart from it; the general intellectual environment, as well as the
common language that reflects and protects that environment,
exercises practical constraints on idiosyncrasy and conceptual
constraints on imagination. The inevitable conservatism of
formal legal education, and of the process of selecting lawyers for
judicial and administrative office, adds further centripetal
pressure.'
Although arguing for much more convergence than I would support,5
Dworkin's general point can be extrapolated to apply to judicial reliance
on comprehensive convictions. In that case, the necessary reliance on
comprehensive convictions in hard cases does not necessarily mean that
judges will make radically different interpretations of the law.
Furthermore, both this convergence and "incompletely theorized
agreements on particular outcomes" will make it appear as though
judges are not relying on a plurality of comprehensive convictions in
hard cases. As a result, this presents an additional reason why the
disestablishment model has been so widely accepted and why the
religious dimension of judicial decision making has remained
substantially hidden.
2. Washington v. Glucksberg
However, in some hard cases like Washington v. Glucksberg, the
necessary reliance on comprehensive convictions becomes more evident.
It is for this reason that these cases are so contentious; their resolution
requires relying on a bedrock religious or comprehensive conviction
about authentic human existence. Consequently, in this section, it is
important to keep in mind that the analysis of the Supreme Court and
Ninth Circuit en banc opinions is done for a very specific purpose. The
purpose is not to deem one result correct and the other false. Rather,
the purpose is to demonstrate that both opinions implicitly rely on
comprehensive convictions and thus support the religionist-
disestablishment model of judicial decision making. Thus, in reading
the following discussion, it is essential that these opinions are viewed
55. Id. at 88. Cf. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM, §§. 55-58 (Michael
Ansaldi, trans., Paul Gewirtz, ed., 1989) (arguing that sociological factors such as the
operating technique of judges and lawyers, facts of a case, and real-life norms are powerful
sources of certainty or predictability).
56. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 11 (1996). Dworkin argues that "[o]ur constitution is law, and
like all law it is anchored in history, practice, and integrity. Most cases at law-even most
constitutional cases-are not hard cases. The ordinary craft of a judge dictates an answer and
leaves no room for the play of personal moral conviction." Id
MARQ UETTE LAW REVIEW
with respect to this purpose and not with respect to the issue of which
result was correct.
Washington v. Glucksberg57 involved a Washington state criminal
statute that makes "[p]romoting a suicide attempt" a felony. The
Washington statute provides: "'A person is guilty of promoting a
suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to
attempt suicide."'58  The central issue before the court was whether
Washington's ban on assisted suicide violated the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 9  The District Court held that "a
competent, terminally ill adult has a constitutionally guaranteed right
under the Fourteenth Amendment to commit physician-assisted
suicide."'' Furthermore, the District Court held that the Washington
ban on assisted suicide violated the Due Process Clause because it
placed an undue burden on this constitutionally protected liberty
interest and that it violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Ninth
Circuit initially reversed, but on rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the District Court on Due Process Clause grounds.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that there
was not a fundamental right to assistance in committing suicide
protected by the Due Process Clause and that the statute was rationally
related to the legitimate governmental purposes.6
Rather than giving a complete analysis of the Supreme Court and
the en banc Ninth Circuit opinions, I want to focus on three ways in
which these opinions, especially the Ninth Circuit opinion, demonstrate
that these Courts had to rely on a comprehensive or religious claim
about authentic human existence to resolve this case. In other words,
this case supports the religionist-disestablishment model by graphically
demonstrating the necessary role of comprehensive convictions in
57. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
58. Id. at 2261 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code 9A.36.060(1) (1994)).
59. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
60. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1462 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), affd en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). The plaintiffs included four Washington
physicians who would assist certain of their terminally ill patients end their lives but for the
statute banning assisted suicide, three gravely ill patients of these doctors who died after the
case began, and a non-profit organization ("Compassion In Dying") that counsels people
contemplating physician-assisted suicide.
61. Id. at 2271.
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resolving hard cases and in exhibiting how these comprehensive
convictions remain implicit in the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court
Opinions. For the most part, I will focus on the en banc Ninth Circuit
opinion in Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 2 because it
makes this reliance more evident than the Supreme Court opinion, and
it provides a better example of the religionist-disestablishment model
with respect to judicial opinion writing.
First, the Ninth Circuit's rhetoric suggests that the right to die is
eminently a religious issue. Following the Supreme Court's approach to
the abortion cases, the Ninth Circuit noted that the right to die and
abortion cases present issues of "profound spiritual importance" and
that "both arouse similar religious and moral concerns." 63 Further, in
beginning its consideration of whether there was a liberty interest in the
right to die, the Ninth Circuit "reiterate[d] a few fundamental precepts
that guide[d] [them]." The first was a "cautionary note" from Roe v.
Wade:
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and
emotional nature of the.., controversy, of the vigorous opposing
views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly
absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy,
one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human
existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and
family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes
and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's
thinking and conclusions.6"
Obviously, these statements cannot establish the necessity of relying on
comprehensive convictions in this case. However, when considered in
relationship with the other aspects of this opinion and the Supreme
Court opinion, these statements have an additive or cumulative effect of
reinforcing the other two ways in which these opinions demonstrate the
religionist-disestablishment model.
Second, the Ninth Circuit surveyed "historical attitudes" and
"current societal attitudes" about suicide which further suggests that the
Ninth Circuit realized that their determination of what constitutes a
fundamental liberty interest would rely on, at least implicitly, a
comprehensive or religious conviction about authentic human
62. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258 (1997).
63. lId at 800-01.
64. ld. at 800 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,116, (1973)) (emphasis added).
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existence.6 For example, these surveys included Christian, Jewish
(religious even under a narrow definition of religion), Greek, Stoic, and
Roman attitudes toward suicide.66 The court's discussion of these
attitudes often identified the comprehensive notion of authentic human
existence that legitimated or prohibited the act of suicide. For instance,
the court noted that "the more powerfully the Church instilled in
believers the idea that this world was a vale of tears and sin and
temptation, where they waited uneasily until death released them into
eternal glory, the more irresistible the temptation to suicide became." 67
The court's explicit recognition of the role of comprehensive convictions
in justifying or prohibiting suicide thus suggests that they were aware
that their decision would finally have to rest on a comprehensive
conviction and that it may rest or be influenced by one or more of those
surveyed. Otherwise, the court could just have tallied who was for and
who was against suicide without transcribing the comprehensive
convictions which legitimate or prohibit suicide.
In addition, the Ninth Circuit's consideration of this wide range of
attitudes about suicide results from its adoption of the broad method of
Due Process Clause analysis.' This method focuses on preventing a
premature limitation of the scope of liberty.69 The goal is to treat liberty
65. Compassion in Dying, 79 F. 3d at 806-12. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-63; Peter G.
Daniels, An Illinois Physician Assisted Suicide Act: A Merciful End to a Terminally I11
Criminal Tradition, 28 LoY. U. CHI. L. J. 763, 837 n.24 (1997) (claiming that the origin of
laws against suicide resides within Judeo-Christian values).
66. The parallel treatment of these different historical attitudes and contemporary
societal attitudes by the courts in both Compassion in Dying and Roe supports a functional
definition of religion (like the one proposed above) which treats all of these attitudes as
religious or comprehensive claims about authentic human existence. It indicates the
functional equivalence of these attitudes in justifying norms for resolving these hard cases.
67. Compassion in Dying, 79 F. 3d at 808 (quoting Thomas J. Marzen, et al., Suicide: A
Constitutional Right, 24 DuO. L. REV. 1, 25 (1985)).
68. The Ninth Circuit's broad method of Due Process analysis proceeded in two steps.
In the first step, the court considered "whether there is a liberty interest in choosing the time
and manner of one's death ... Is there a right to die?" Id. at 798. In the second step, the
court considered "whether prohibiting physicians from prescribing life-ending medication for
use by terminally ill patients who wish to die violates the patients' due process rights." Id. at
799. Further, the second step involved applying a balancing test under which the court
weighed the individual's liberty interest against the relevant state interests. As a result of this
method, the Ninth Circuit held "that a liberty interest exists in the choice of how and when
one dies, and that the provision of the Washington statute banning assisted suicide, as applied
to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication
prescribed by their doctors, violates the Due Process Clause. Id. at 838.
69. In this respect, the court emphasized that "'[t]he full scope of liberty guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points
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as "a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints"'7
and not to prejudge the issue based on previous wisdom and previous
cases. The "rational continuum" is ascertained "in light of the existing
circumstances as well as our historic traditions."'" The review of
historical and current societal views thus serves to challenge judges to
rethink their presuppositions about liberty (i.e., how the scope of liberty
is determined by their comprehensive convictions about authentic
human existence) and to ensure that the court is not missing an
important restriction on liberty. Thus, the effect of the Ninth Circuit's
adoption of the broad method was not only to disclose the necessity of
relying on comprehensive convictions about authentic human existence
to determine whether there was a liberty interest to commit suicide but
also to prompt the court to explore alternative comprehensive or
religious evaluations of suicide before making their evaluation of
whether there was a fundamental liberty interest.
From the standpoint of the religionist-disestablishment model, the
wisdom of this broad method is that the judicial opinion discloses the
necessity of the religious dimension of judicial decision making in these
hard cases (i.e., minimizes the concealment of what is at stake) by
surveying these attitudes. On the other hand, the opinion does not
explicitly adopt one of these religious convictions. Rather, the court
emphasized its "endeavor to conduct an objective analysis" and resolved
the question by adopting a principle of liberty (a lower-level or
noncomprehensive principle) as the basis of their ruling. Thus, this
approach allowed for the possibility for a plurality of comprehensive
convictions to support the same conclusion and prevented the
establishment of one comprehensive conviction as the basis for
determining what constitutes a fundamental liberty.
By contrast, the Supreme Court used a restrained method of Due
Process Clause analysis. The Supreme Court's method of substantive-
due-process analysis had two primary features: (1) requiring as a
prerequisite that the fundamental right or liberty is "objectively, 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'... and 'implicit in the
pricked out in terms of taking of property, freedom of speech, press, and religion .... ' Id. at
800 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). This
discussion of the scope of liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause clearly indicates that
the term liberty is indeterminate and that this is a hard case (Le., rule of recognition is
indeterminate).
70. Id.
71. I& at 803.
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concept of ordered liberty'; and (2) "a 'careful description' of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest. ' As is evident from the Supreme
Court's "careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest" in defining the issue, the second feature determines what
history is relevant. The Supreme Court defined the issue as: "whether
the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a
right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing
so."' 73 This framing of the issue combined the question of the existence
of a fundamental liberty interest (right to die) with a means of
implementing that right (assistance) such that the issue becomes
whether their is "an interest in implementing that general liberty
interest by a particular means."'74 The effect of the Supreme Court's
restrained method was to conceal as much as possible their reliance on a
comprehensive conviction by framing the issue in such a way that the
historical materials appeared to lead to one result. In this respect, the
Supreme Court based its reversal of the Ninth Circuit on the grounds
that "[t]he history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this
country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all
efforts to permit it. ' 75 As a result, the Court held that the asserted
"right" to assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest (i.e., not
"objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition") and
that Washington's ban on assisted suicide did "not violate the
fourteenth Amendment, either on its face or 'as applied to competent,
terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining
medication prescribed by their doctors.' 76
The Court justified this restrained Due Process method on the
grounds that it "tends to rein in the subjective elements that are
necessarily present in due process judicial review" and "avoids the need
for complex balancing of competing interests in every case."7 In other
words, this method could be reformulated as a claim that Due Process
Clause analysis must refer to some public values ("objectively, 'deeply
rooted in this Nations' history and tradition') rather than some
72. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268, 2269.
73. Id. at 2269.
74. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 801.
75. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271. The Court further noted that assisting suicide was a
crime "[i]n almost every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy" and that "for
over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise
disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide." Id. at 2263.
76. Id. at 2275 (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838).
77. Id. at 2268 (emphasis added).
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"subjective element" (i.e., comprehensive or religious conviction). We
could call this the "Public Values Objection" to the religionist-
disestablishment model in that it rejects judges relying on
comprehensive or religious convictions to determine the scope of liberty
(formally) provided for in the Due Process Clause. Note that the
Supreme Court cited the history of regulating assisted suicide but did
not consider the history of comprehensive or religious thinking on that
issue or on the issue of suicide like the Ninth Circuit did. Rather, the
Supreme Court's restrained Due Process method follows the
disestablishment model so that "historical attitudes" and "current
societal attitudes" (i.e., comprehensive convictions) are perceived as
subjective and irrelevant to the determination of the scope of political
value of liberty. Conversely, history "objectively" determines the scope
of the political value of liberty by identifying which notion of liberty is
"objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'
However, the religionist-disestablishment model could respond to
the Political Values Objection as the Ninth Circuit did in Compassion in
Dying by indicating that "historical evidence alone is not a sufficient
basis for rejecting a claimed liberty interest;" history is not the sole
guide for deciding whether there is a liberty interest.78 In other words,
the indeterminacy of the scope of the Due Process Clause notion of
liberty cannot be "solved" by referring to history. First, history has to
be evaluated to determine which aspect of it is the "relevant" history.
In addition, the positions expressed in the relevant history must be
evaluated to determine which position is authoritative. Consequently,
both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court implicitly relied on an
extra-legal norm to determine which aspect of history was relevant and
then which position expressed in the relevant history was authoritative.
Since all norms implicitly or explicitly rely on a comprehensive or
religious conviction, both courts implicitly relied on religious convictions
about authentic human existence to evaluate history. Further, because
"history" determines whether there is a fundamental liberty interest for
the Supreme Court, this reveals that the Supreme Court's denial of a
78. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 805 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967))
(emphasizing that "[w]ere history our sole guide, the Virginia anti-miscegenation statute ...
would still be in force because anti-miscegenation laws were commonplace both when the
United States was founded and when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted"). Note that
this argument about the necessary reliance on a comprehensive norm to evaluate history
would also apply to claims that judges should rely on "community morality" in hard cases. In
this respect, the Ninth Circuit's comments were referring to their own historical survey of
comprehensive evaluations (community moralities) of suicide.
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fundamental right to assisted suicide depended upon a comprehensive
or religious conviction about authentic human existence. In addition,
recall that even though the Ninth Circuit utilized a "rational continuum"
or broad method of due process analysis, it did not philosophically
analyze the concept of liberty to clarify the indeterminate notion of
liberty in the Due Process Clause, but it also looked at history to
ascertain what this indeterminate notion of liberty required. When it
looked at history, it looked at the historical and current comprehensive
evaluations of suicide rather than tallying legal prohibitions (like the
Supreme Court) or surveying conceptual analyses of the concept of
liberty. Therefore, even though the Ninth Circuit did not identify what
more than history (i.e., what extra-legal norm) informed their
determination of the scope of liberty, their historical analysis suggests
and logic requires that they relied on a comprehensive or religious
conviction about authentic human existence to determine whether there
was a fundamental liberty interest in determining the time and manner
of one's own death. In this respect, it should be noted that neither court
could finally give a satisfying account or defense of their determination
of the scope of liberty and their evaluation of history because they could
not explicitly acknowledge the comprehensive conviction that would
make their decision more fully intelligible. Thus, the third way that
these opinions demonstrate the necessary reliance on religious beliefs is
to demonstrate the logical necessity of relying on religious claims about
authentic human existence to determine the scope of liberty in the Due
Process Clause.
The effect of implicating these comprehensive convictions about
authentic human existence is most dramatically seen with respect to the
radical differences in the two courts formulation of the issue. Recall
that the Supreme Court defined the issue as "whether the 'liberty'
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so. '
By contrast, the Ninth circuit defined the issue in two parts ("whether
there is a liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one's
death" or "[i]s there a right to die?" and "whether prohibiting
physicians from prescribing life-ending medication for use by terminally
ill patients who wish to die violates the patients' due process rights") so
that the right (right to die) and the means (medical assistance) were
kept separate.80 As a result, the relevant history considered by the Ninth
79. Id. at 2269.
80. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 798-99.
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Circuit was the historical and current societal attitudes on suicide not on
assisting suicide. Contrary to the Supreme Courts finding of a pervasive
prohibition on assisting suicide, the Ninth Circuit found that "[t]oday,
no state has a statute prohibiting suicide or attempted suicide; nor has
any state had such a statute for at least 10 years."81 Further, as the Ninth
Circuit demonstrated, history is on both sides of the suicide question
such that they had to rely (implicitly) on a claim about authentic human
existence in order to decide which history was authoritative.
One may respond that the Supreme Court's denial of this right
implicitly relied on an understanding of authentic human existence but
that the Ninth Circuit merely left the decision of suicide up to the
individual. For example, in Compassion in Dying, the court cites Casey
for the proposition that "'[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of person hood were they formed under the compulsion of the
State." '8' Further, the court claims that "Casey and Cruzan provide
persuasive evidence that the Constitution encompasses a due process
liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of one's death-that
there is, in short, a constitutionally recognized 'right to die..'. From
this comment and others by the court,' one may claim that the court did
not import its understanding of authentic human existence but merely
decided that the liberty interests stipulated in the Due Process Clause
provide a legal, not comprehensive, norm supporting the autonomy of
individuals to decide these matters. However, note that the court says
that Casey and Cruzan provide "evidence" for their conclusion rather
than saying they logically entail this conclusion. Further, recall that the
Ninth Circuit clearly recognized the indeterminacy of this notion of
liberty. Consequently, extending the rational continuum from Planned
81. Id. At 810. Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that a majority of states still have
laws against assisting suicide, it further found that "[b]y the time the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted in 1868, suicide was generally not punishable, and in only nine of the 37 states is
it clear that there were statues prohibiting assisting suicide." Id. at 809.
82. Id. at 806-12.
83. Id. at 813. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
84. Id at 816.
85. In its conclusion the court emphasized that "[t]hose who believe strongly that death
must come without physician assistance are free to follow that creed, be they doctors or
patients. They are not free, however, to force their views, their religious convictions, or their
philosophies on all the other members of a democratic society, and to compel those whose
values differ with theirs to die painful, protracted, and agonizing deaths." Id. at 839.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Parenthood v. Casey" and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health"
to support a right to die requires that the court determine that it should
be extended. In other words, the Ninth Circuit had to rely on an extra-
legal norm (i.e., a comprehensive or religious conviction about authentic
human existence) to determine whether liberty ought to be extended to
include the right to die. Moreover, the juxtaposition of the these
opinions on the same fundamental liberties question helps disclose the
necessity of relying on comprehensive convictions (the religious
dimension of judicial decision making) both for courts that appear to
embrace the religionist-disestablishment model (the Ninth Circuit) and
for those that attempt to avoid the religionist-disestablishment model by
adopting the disestablishment model (the Supreme Court). Thus, these
opinions support the religionist-disestablishment model by revealing the
logical necessity of relying on comprehensive or religious claims about
authentic human existence in hard cases such as those involving the
scope of liberty in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
3. The Justification of Judicial Decisions
Despite the necessary reliance on religious convictions in the process
of deliberation, however, one might respond that these comprehensive
convictions should appear in judicial opinions (religionist model)
because the rule of law requires that judges set forth or make public all
of the reasons for their decisions. Concealing these comprehensive or
religious convictions about authentic human existence insincerely
suggests (the Insincerity Objection) that the reasons given in the
opinion were the only reasons for the judge's decision." Furthermore,
concealing these comprehensive convictions will cause citizens to loose
faith in the judicial process and the rule of law will be undermined.
Although I can only begin to address the Insincerity Objection here,
I will provisionally specify several reasons why the religionist-
disestablishment model requires that comprehensive or religious
convictions should remain implicit in judges opinions. First and
foremost, the establishment clause appears to prohibit judges from
explicitly articulating these religious or comprehensive convictions as
86. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming the "essential holding of Roe v. Wade").
87. 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding competent patients have a liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment).
88. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 3, at 104.
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reasons for their decisions.8 If this were not the case, subsequent
litigants in analogous hard cases would have to challenge both the courts
comprehensive conviction about authentic human existence and its
analysis of legal principles in order to prevail. Further, although at the
time of the first amendment it was assumed that almost everyone held
comprehensive convictions that included a notion of a supreme being,9°
many now hold comprehensive convictions without a notion of a
supreme being. In order to maintain the first amendment's intent of
prohibiting the state's explicit recognition of a particular comprehensive
conviction or claim (originally thought to include a notion of a supreme
being), the first amendment should be interpreted to prohibit
establishing all comprehensive claims including those without a notion
of a supreme being. As a result, even though comprehensive
convictions are necessarily relied on in the deliberation of hard cases,
the religionist-disestablishment model recognizes that comprehensive
convictions must only implicitly inform judicial opinions because the
first amendment requires that the judges never explicitly endorse a
comprehensive conviction."
89. For an argument that the establishment clause applies to the judicial branch of
government, see id. at 10-12. Further, for a summary of Perry's general understanding of the
establishment clause, which I am adopting here, see supra note 3. A fuller account of this
interpretation of the establishment clause would argue that the establishment clause should
be interpreted in light of the broad formal definition of religion specified above. This
understanding of religion has been more or less adopted by the Supreme Court in the
conscientious objector cases. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)
(recognizing the defendants' non-theistic convictions as functionally equivalent to theistic
religious convictions because the person held "sincere and meaningful belief[s] which
occupie[d] in the life of [their] posessor[s] a place parallel to that filled by the God of those
admittedly qualifying for the exemption"); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-43
(1970) (extending the religious exclusion to moral or ethical views that were deeply held). Of
course, this would require a unitary definition of religion to apply to both the free exercise
and establishment clauses. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting) (arguing that religion only appears once in the First Amendment in reference
to the free exercise and establishment clause and that it should have one meaning not a broad
one (free exercise) and a narrow one (establishment clause)). In addition, this would entail
rejecting the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test or reinterpreting "secular" to mean
noncomprehensive. Cf Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(contending that the secular purpose prong should be abandoned and argues that "discerning
the subjective motivation of those enacting the statue is to be honest, almost always an
impossible task").
90. SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN
AMERICA 64 (1963) (quoting Benjamin Franklin's autobiography) (noting that even a
rationalist like Benjamin Franklin believed that the "essentials of every religion" included
"the existence of the Deity").
91. Cf GAMWELL, supra note 4, at 205 Gamwell's interpretation of the meaning of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment requires that:
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In that case, the religionist-disestablishment model maintains that
judges should justify their decisions based on noncomprehensive
principles and on the lowest level principle possible in order to leave
open the question of comprehensive justification.9' As noted above, the
Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying provides a good example of the
religionist-disestablishment model because they were able to achieve
this objective but still disclosed that they had to rely on a comprehensive
conviction about authentic human existence. In addition, Greenawalt
argues that keeping comprehensive convictions out of judicial opinions
is not insincere because citizens do not "necessarily expect that public
advocacy will reflect all bases of decision." 93  He argues that judges
routinely conceal innovative steps in the law by suggesting in their
opinions that their holding is already covered by a principle found in
prior cases. Furthermore, in addressing politics in general, he argues
that "constructive dialogue on deeper concerns is much more likely in
other settings than the resolution of political issues" and that "there is
little point in developing 'more complete' grounds, if the extra grounds
developed are unlikely to enlighten others, may hinder constructive
dialogue, and will probably cause feelings of exclusion and alienation. ''
If we apply these points to judicial decision making, the religionist-
disestablishment model thus appreciates that legal opinions are not the
All religions are separated from the state in the sense that the state may not
explicitly endorse any answer to the comprehensive question. At the same time,
religion is essential to the body politic in the sense that political decisions should
imply the valid comprehensive conviction. Politics is consistent in principle with a
plurality of legitimate religions because they are united through democratic
discourse, and adherents of all religions can consistently be democratically civil
precisely because all religions claim to represent the valid understanding of human
authenticity as such.
Id.
92. Cf. CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996).
Sunstein argues that law is basically comprised of "incompletely theorized agreements on
particular outcomes, accompanied by agreements on the narrow or low-level principles that
account for them." Id. at 37. This allows for substantial disagreement on more general
theoretical principles that attempt to explain and legitimize the law. Consequently, "people
may agree on a correct outcome even though they do not have a theory to account for their
judgments." Id. at 7.
93. GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 11, at 163.
94. Id. at 164. Cf. Joan B. Gottschall, Response to Judge Wendell Griffen, 81 MARQ. L.
REv. 533 (1998). Judge Gottschall argues that including religious sources when justifying
decisions is "inappropriate and imprudent." Id. at 534. She further suggests that by relying
on religious sources, a judge's decision would be perceived as "an idiosyncratic expression of
[her] particular personality or background" rather than as a fair decision based on recognized
sources of legal authority that both parties would accept." Id. at 534-35.
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best place or a helpful place to engage in debate about the meaning of
authentic human existence. Thus, if properly executed, the religionist-
disestablishment model does not necessarily conceal (it can disclose) the
reliance on comprehensive convictions, but at the same time, it prevents
the establishment of a single comprehensive conviction as the basis for
a decision and allows for the possibility for a plurality of comprehensive
convictions to support the same conclusion.
Finally, requiring a less than comprehensive justification in a hard
case leaves open the possibility that judges are sometimes warranted in
relying on their best intuitions about how to achieve justice in these
hard cases.95 In other words, the religionist-disestablishment model does
not require that judges become philosophers or theologians. This seems
to confuse competence in theoretical reason for competence in practical
reason. Ideally, the judge would be aware of the comprehensive
conviction that, at least implicitly, informs her judgment but that will not
allows be the case. Furthermore, even if she is aware of her
comprehensive conviction, she might not be able to explicate fully the
argument that relates it with her result. Moreover, judicial activity aims
at doing justice not with providing a philosophy of justice. Thus, for all
these reasons, the religionist-disestablishment model does not aim at
concealment but at recognizing certain legal, practical, and
epistemological limitations on the full disclosure of comprehensive
convictions.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, although there are logically four different models of
how religious beliefs are related to judicial decision making, three of the
models have proved to be inadequate to explain the logically necessary
reliance on comprehensive or religious convictions in judicial
deliberation in hard cases. Surprisingly, the de facto disestablishment
model (represented by John Rawls), which maintains that religious
convictions should not be relied on either in judicial deliberation or
justification, has turned out to have serious problems that call into
question its validity. This model that has tacitly informed most judges
and lawyers understanding of judicial decision making and has caused a
blindness to the religious dimension of judicial decision making. For
95. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929). Hutcheson argued that judges intuit or feel
their way to the decision. Id. at 282. Once the judge has considered all the available
material, the judge waits for the intuition, the hunch, which leads to the solution. Id. at 287.
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example, the Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg appeared to
adopt this model, but further analysis of that case revealed that the
court necessarily relied on a comprehensive conviction about authentic
human existence to reach its conclusion that there is no fundamental
liberty interest in assisted suicide. By contrast, the Ninth Circuit en banc
opinion in this case appeared to adopt the religionist-disestablishment
model. The religionist-disestablish model of judicial decision making
maintains that judicial deliberation necessarily relies on a
comprehensive or religious conviction about authentic human existence
in hard cases but that the establishment clause of the first amendment
requires that these comprehensive claims remain implicit in judicial
opinions. The analysis of the Ninth Circuit opinion indicated how the
court revealed that comprehensive convictions were required for their
decision. To prevent the establishment of religion, however, the court
did not explicitly adopt a particular comprehensive conviction.
Accordingly, this model of judicial decision making allows for the
possibility that a plurality of comprehensive convictions can justify the
same result but on different comprehensive grounds. Furthermore, the
religionist-disestablishment model maintains that the nature of judicial
decision making as such in hard cases requires judges to rely on
comprehensive or religious convictions. Thus, in hard cases, judges
must resolve legal disputes according to their best comprehensive or
religious judgment of what ought to be done even though judges should
keep these comprehensive convictions implicit in the process of
justification to prevent the establishment of a comprehensive conviction
in violation of the establishment clause.
Moreover, this suggests that the de facto disestablishment of law is
much less pervasive than it might seem. Further, given a certain reading
of the establishment clause, this may be more adequately understood as
a de jure disestablishment of religion" from the justification of all cases
and from judicial deliberation in easy cases. This leaves open a large
role for religion in the deliberative process of hard cases. Assuming this
argument has some merit, it suggests that religion should be viewed as a
substantial resource for understanding the law and that the legal
curriculum should be modified to reflect this.
[Vol. 81:255
